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Using Cox proportional hazard regression analysis, we find that states are more likely to adopt 
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The Political Economy of State Government  
Subsidy Adoption:  The Case of Ethanol
a
 
 
 
I.  Introduction 
 Beginning in the 1980s, state and local governments increasingly began to rely on 
subsidies and tax breaks to stimulate growth in employment and business activity.  Between 
1984 and 1993, the number of states offering various incentives increases from 27 to 44 (Chi, 
1994).  A significant motivation for these state incentive packages was to stimulate broad 
economic activity in economically distressed rural areas (Greenberg and Reeder, 1998).  
Coinciding with the increase in the use of broad subsidies were more targeted subsidies.  The 
focus of this paper is on factors that influence the adoption of such targeted subsidies and tax 
credits, focusing on incentives to ethanol producers.
1
  The United States experienced the 
complete emergence of the ethanol industry over a relatively short period, beginning in the early 
1980s.  As highlighted by Gardner (2007), federal policies have been an important driving force 
in fostering ethanol production, and state subsidies have also been influential (Cotti and 
Skidmore, 2010).  Nearly all the current research on subsidies and tax credits has focused on 
evaluating the impacts of economic development incentives, whereas little research has focused 
on the factors the lead to subsidy adoption.   
 The present study makes several contributions to the work on public sector policy 
innovation.  First, while there are now several studies that examine the adoption of new sources 
of state revenue such as lotteries or tax amnesties (Berry and Berry, 1990; Dubin, Graetz, and 
Wilde, 1992; Alm, McKee, and Skidmore, 1993), and while there is also work on changes to 
state political institutions such as the introduction of tax and expenditure limitations or balanced 
                                                 
1 For the remainder of the paper, we use the term ―subsidies‖ to refer to explicit subsidies, including tax credits 
offered to businesses. 
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budget requirements (Poterba, 1994, 1995; Rueben, 1996; Alm and Skidmore, 1999), researchers 
have not explicitly examined factors that determine the adoption of subsidies.  Given the plethora 
of new subsidies and tax credits introduced across the states over the past 30 years, this gap is of 
note.  In addition, while the work of Cotti and Skidmore (2010) evaluates the economic effects of 
the state level subsidies in the emerging biofuel industry, little is known about the underlying 
factors that have driven this important policy intervention.  Finally, this research contributes to 
the literature on the policy innovation process (Poterba, 1994; Besley and Case, 2000), and it 
also offers insights into the political economy of the emerging ethanol industry. 
Using hazard analysis methods, we find that state governments are more likely to adopt 
ethanol subsidies when corn production is high, when corn prices are low and gasoline prices are 
high, when a state is affiliated with the National Corn Growers Association (NCCA), when a 
check-off is present, and when state government is under the control of Democrats.  We also 
uncover a complicated relationship between corn prices and affiliation with the NCCA.  
Specifically, when corn prices fall, states are more likely to become affiliated with the NCCA.  
While both of these factors are correlated with subsidy adoption, our analysis suggests that corn 
price is the strong force and leads both to NCCA membership and to subsidy adoption. 
In the next section, we provide a brief review of the most relevant research on the policy 
innovation process in general as well as the relevant research on the emerging biofuel industry.  
In section 3, we present our theoretical framework, and section 4 presents the data and empirical 
analysis. Section 5 concludes.  
 
II. Literature Review 
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 In this section, we present a brief review of the ethanol industry, related research on 
policy innovation, and recent research on some effects from the emerging biofuel industry.   
A Brief Overview of the Emerging Ethanol Industry 
Ethanol or ethyl alcohol, typically produced from corn, is a primary biofuel additive for 
gasoline. While fuel ethanol has been around for over 100 years, until the early 1980s 
commercial production was trivial.  However, spurred by a tremendous increase in state and 
federal subsidies throughout the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s, ethanol production had expanded to 
over 10 billion gallons in the United States by the end of 2010. As of January 2010, the 
Renewable Fuels Association reports that there are currently 189 ethanol distilleries in operation 
and another 16 under construction.  When current construction is complete, total U.S. production 
capacity will reach 14.46 billion gallons. The location of these plants is focused in the Midwest 
and Great Plains States, or in states nearest to corn growers, although ethanol producers can also 
be found throughout the country.  Overall, there has been exponential growth in ethanol 
production and capacity in the United States over the last 30 years.  While there are a number of 
studies that have examined the growth of the industry, to our knowledge researchers have not 
examined the underlying forces that led to subsidy adoption, which has been critical to the 
emergence of the industry. As discussed below, a number of studies have examined policy 
adoption in other areas.  We draw on this literature to provide a framework for understanding the 
forces that have led to state government ethanol subsidy adoption in a numerous states over the 
last 30 years.  
Policy Innovation/Adoption 
 A standard approach in the economic analysis of policy is to find some source of policy 
variation and to use this source to identify the independent impact of policy variation on 
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behavior.   For example, the wide variation in policies across state governments – in taxes, 
regulations, minimum wages, balanced budget requirements, investment incentives, and the like 
– provide a natural laboratory in which the effects of these policies can be investigated.  
However, when the policies themselves are subject to adoption as part of the formation of 
endogenous policy formation, then it clearly cannot be assumed that these policies are in fact 
exogenous variables.  Put differently, time- and state-varying policies can be studied as either 
right-hand side variables (e.g., as exogenous variables) or as left-hand side variables (e.g., as 
endogenous variables) in any empirical formulation (Besley and Case, 2000).  In the latter case, 
the choice of these policies can be usefully examined as the outcome of the political process in 
the state.  This is the underlying premise of our approach here.  Indeed, there are large theoretical 
and empirical literatures on the endogenous determination of tax, expenditure, trade, agricultural, 
and other policies.
2
  These literatures form the basis for our theoretical approach, as discussed 
later.   
 Research on the Effects of the Ethanol Industry 
 
 Much of the research on policies related to the ethanol industry has focused on the 
economic impacts of policy, especially on the allocative effects of ethanol subsidies.  These 
subsidies have a strong appeal for certain farm interests (i.e., corn producers), but the net societal 
gains of such policies are questionable.  For example, Gardner (2007) employs a cost-benefit 
analysis to determine the net societal benefits of relying more heavily on ethanol as a renewable 
fuel source.  Gardener‘s work indicates that the $0.51 per gallon federal ethanol subsidy results 
in a significant deadweight loss.  He concludes that ―ethanol subsidies and mandates are unlikely 
to generate social gains.‖  Similarly, Hahn and Cecot (2007) employ a cost-benefit method to 
                                                 
2  For example, see Persson and Tabellini (2002) and Mueller (2003) for comprehensive discussions of much of this 
work. 
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evaluate current federal biofuel policies, concluding that under current policies the costs of 
increased production are likely to exceed the benefits.  Hahn and Cecot (2007) identify federal as 
well as state and local government subsidies and regulations as the driving force of the ethanol 
industry. ―Corn states‖ use a variety of incentives.3  For example, Illinois grants up to $5.5 
million for the production of new plants; Indiana gives a $0.125 per gallon production tax credit; 
Iowa extends 0 percent interest loans up to half the cost of production project; and Missouri 
gives producers tax incentives of $0.20 per gallon of ethanol produced.  Even many states that 
are not typically thought of as ―corn states‖ have adopted similar subsidies in an attempt to 
attract the industry.  Hawaii has a tax credit equal to 30 percent of nameplate capacity; Maine 
also has a tax credit of $0.05 per gallon; and Vermont gives loans to assist research and planning 
for the production of biofuels.   
Most recently, Cotti and Skidmore (2010) examine the impact of state government 
subsidies on ethanol production.  They conclude that state subsidies have played an important 
role in ethanol plant location decisions. 
To our knowledge, no studies have evaluated the underlying forces that determine why 
states adopt subsidies in general, or subsidies targeted at the ethanol industry in particular.  
Despite the plethora of new state subsidies and tax credits that have been introduced over the 
past 30 years, no research has examined the political economy of state government subsidy 
adoption.  Given the implications of subsidies and tax credit adoption for economic activity as 
well as for state tax bases, we believe that this analysis is necessary and useful.  The next section 
presents our theoretical framework for this analysis. 
 
III. Theoretical Framework 
                                                 
3 A ―corn‖ state is defined by Hahn and Cecot (2007) as a state that grows greater than 1 million bushels of corn per 
year.  
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 Government revenue and expenditure decisions are made in political markets, and the role 
of political forces in the design of government revenue structure and expenditure allocation has 
received increasing attention.  The starting point for much of this analysis is the standard median 
voter model.  As first argued by Bowen (1943) and Black (1958), the median voter model 
indicates that a community's choice of public services under majority rule is the median of the 
individual demands; that is, under certain restrictive conditions, a political equilibrium under 
majority rule reflects the preferences of the median voter.  Borcherding and Deacon (1972) and 
Bergstrom and Goodman (1973) use this framework to demonstrate that a jurisdiction‘s demand 
for public services depends upon the income of the median voter, the median (tax) price of the 
public good, and the tastes of the median voter, or variables that capture the demand side of the 
political process.  This approach has been usefully applied to a wide range of theoretical and 
empirical issues in public choice, with generally favorable but sometimes mixed results.
4
 
However, the relevance of the median voter model to the issue of ethanol subsidy 
adoption is not especially obvious.  Special targeted tax incentives benefit a small group of 
individuals (e.g., the recipients of the incentives) at the expense of those individuals who must 
pay for the incentives (e.g., the median voter); that is, these incentives generate ―rents‖ (or 
above-normal returns), and individuals are willing to invest considerable resources in ―rent 
seeking‖ activities to obtain these rents from government.  It seems unlikely that the median 
voter would favor such programs.  Put differently, an ethanol subsidy may well be proposed, but 
the median voter should not vote for the subsidy because the subsidy generates rents that accrue 
to others and the subsidy also generates inefficiencies that reduce welfare.  What can explain the 
political success of special targeted tax incentives in this setting? 
                                                 
4 See Persson and Tabellini (2002) and Mueller (2003) for comprehensive surveys of the public choice literature. 
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Other public choice approaches have been proposed that seem more relevant to the 
adoption of special provisions like ethanol subsidies.  These approaches often pursue different 
modeling strategies, but even so all incorporate four common features: individual voter 
preferences, the preferences of elected politicians, political institutions, and collective action by 
lobby groups.  It is especially the last feature that seems most relevant to the adoption of 
subsidies. 
For example, Peltzman (1976) considered the incentives facing an elected politician to 
introduce regulations like price supports that generated both rents and excess burdens.  He 
concluded that a vote-maximizing politician would support regulations that balanced the 
marginal gain in voting support from producers from an increase in their rents with the marginal 
voting loss from consumers due to the combined increase in rents and excess burdens.  Using a 
different approach (e.g., probabilistic voting), Hettich and Winer (1988) argued that tax structure 
is the result of a process of balancing the political costs of generating revenues (e.g., expected votes 
lost) against the political gains from making increased expenditures (e.g., expected votes gained), 
where individual voters are assumed to value expenditures and oppose taxation.  The politically 
optimal tax structure is one that equalizes across all taxpayers the marginal political cost per dollar 
of added revenues, where the marginal cost is measured in terms of the loss of expected votes.    
Grossman and Helpman (1994) similarly assumed that government chooses protective trade policies 
in an attempt to maximize a weighted sum of the utilities of all citizens plus the political 
contributions of lobbyists seeking protection.  The politically optimal tariff is one in which the 
marginal reduction in social welfare from the tariff equals the marginal increase in political 
contributions from the tariff.  Other approaches generally give similar results, and conclude that the 
political costs and benefits of specific government policies are balanced on the margin. 
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This work suggests that subsidies/tax credits will be introduced when the votes lost are more 
than matched by the votes and/or the political contributions gained.  The factors contributing to the 
two sides of this equation are examined here.  The focus is on decisions by state government policy 
makers to adopt new subsidies and/or tax credits targeted at ethanol production.  These factors relate 
mainly to the likelihood that additional subsidies will generate additional political contributions 
from the ethanol industry (e.g., a benefit to politicians), that they may generate additional economic 
activity in the affected region (e.g., a benefit to voters and so to politicians), and that they may cost 
votes via the inefficiencies that they generate and the revenues that must be generated to finance 
them (e.g., a cost to voters and so to politicians).   
On the political benefits side of the scales, political gains of subsidy/tax credit adoption 
could be generated from political contributions from the ethanol industry.  Of particular relevance 
here is the corn lobby; corn producers have much to gain from the increased demand for corn 
resulting from such subsidies. 
Other political benefits could stem from the additional economic activity in the targeted 
industry and regions.  In a broader context, subsidies may also generate perceived environmental 
benefits from reduced reliance on fuels that are thought to generate green-house gases, and they 
may reduce the risks associated with a heavy reliance on imported petroleum.  Of course, special 
interests highlight these potential benefits as they lobby for subsidies.   
The political costs to subsidy/tax credit adoption arise from several sources.  Public 
opposition to ethanol subsidies may come from those who recognize that tax credits can narrow the 
tax base.  Similarly, some recognize the opportunity costs associated with the introduction of 
subsidies.  More broadly the world food price spike that occurred in 2007-2008 renewed concerns 
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about potential food/fuel trade-offs that may exist.
5
  If it is widely perceived that the expansion of 
ethanol production contributed to the food price spike, then many voters may argue that we should 
rethink state and federal policies designed to encourage biofuel production.  In addition, under 
current technologies corn-based ethanol is considerably more expensive to produce than relying on 
existing petroleum reserves. 
How can these various factors be measured and included in an empirical framework?  Our 
main interest is the role of political and lobbying factors.  The political bases of the Republican and 
Democratic parties differ considerably.  Thus, the likelihood of ethanol subsidy adoption may be 
influenced by party control.  In addition, the passage of subsidy/tax credit legislation might be more 
likely to arise if the house, senate, and governorship represent the same political party.  If the 
governorship, house, and senate of a state are controlled by a single party, it is more likely that a 
state will adopt a subsidy/tax credit because a unified government is more likely to pass a bill than a 
government with split control.  Two dummy variables are used here, one for whether or not the 
government is controlled by the Democrats and another for whether or not the government is 
controlled by the Republicans.
6
  This separation of Democrats and Republicans also provides 
information about which political party is more likely to support an ethanol subsidy/tax credit bill.  
Additional political variables include an election year dummy variable. Significant new legislation 
may be more likely to be introduced during election years.  However, if ethanol subsidy/tax credit 
adoption represents a departure from the normal course of political business, and it is possible 
instead that a government will not wish to introduce one during an election year.  The sign on the 
election year variable is therefore ambiguous.  Political agents may receive pressure from 
                                                 
5 According to the United States Agency for International Development, world food prices increased 43 percent 
between March 2007 and March 2008 (http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/humanitarian_assistance/foodcrisis/).  
Increased biofuel production was cited as one of several contributing factors to rising food prices. 
6.Note that some states have split control, so that democratic control and republican control do not sum to one. 
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constituents to adopt subsidies/tax credits if competitor states have such programs.  Therefore, we 
test for neighboring states effects in our analysis as well. 
 As for lobbying activity, the National Corn Growers Association (NCGA) lobbies federal 
and state governments on behalf of corn growers.  Corn growers strongly favor policies that 
increase the demand for corn, and ethanol subsidies clearly favor corn producers.  We include a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if there is an NCGA affiliation in a given state and 0 otherwise.  
Similarly, we also include a variable that measures the number of years that a ―check-off‖ has been 
in place in a state.  The check-off is something like a tax on corn, but the revenues from the 
check-off are used to promote, market, and lobby on behalf of corn growers.  The check-off is a 
measure of the resources available to the corn lobby.  However, the check-off is not the sole 
source of funds for the NCGA.  As highlighted on the NCGA website (http://ncga.com/out-and-
about-industry), large agri-business organizations such as Archer Daniels Midland Company, 
Monsanto, and Syngenta are important partners with the NCGA, and these organizations also 
have an incentive to boost demand for agricultural products and thus the price of corn.  
 It is important to note that over the period of analysis a number of states became affiliated 
with the NCGA and subsequently adopted a check-off.  Related to these factors is the pressure 
put on the lobby firms and on state government by farmers when corn prices fall.  As a result, we 
anticipate that corn prices play an important role in motivating farmers and their agents to 
promote subsidies.  We also note that there are complicated interrelationships between corn 
prices, NCGA membership, and the adoption of a check-off.  Namely, we observe that the 
likelihood of NCGA membership is more likely during periods of low corn prices.
7
  We explore 
these inter-relationships in our empirical analysis.  Last, to measure the influence of the potential 
―corn constituency‖ in a state, we also include the annual production of corn in a state. 
                                                 
7 This analysis is available from the authors upon request. 
 12 
 We also include economic and demographic factors that may play a role in ethanol subsidy 
adoption, factors that largely reflect voter preferences.  During times of economic distress, political 
agents may be inclined to introduce subsidies/tax credits aimed at business activity.  We therefore 
include per capita income and the retail price of gasoline in our analysis.  We hypothesize that 
during state-years in which per capita income is lower, subsidy/tax credit adoption is more likely.  
Similarly, in periods of high gasoline prices subsidy/tax credit adoption is more likely because 
constituents may have a heightened interest in reducing reliance on petroleum imports.  As an 
additional demographic control variable, we include population.  We have no a priori expectations 
about the role that population may play in ethanol subsidy adoption. 
 Data are collected by state annually for the period 1984 through 2007.  Table 1 presents 
summary statistics of the variables used in our analysis, and detailed variable definitions, and data 
sources are provided in the Appendix. 
 
 
IV. Methods, Data, and Empirical Analysis 
Methods and Data 
Our dependent variable in this analysis is based on detailed information that we have 
collected on state-level ethanol subsidies and tax breaks, which were obtained from the U.S. 
Department of Energy.
8
  Our research focuses on 1984 through 2007, a period that covers the 
complete emergence of the biofuel industry in the United States.  Importantly, this time period 
was characterized by the passage of a number of state-level subsidies and tax breaks aimed at 
increasing ethanol production and capacity.  We conducted a thorough search through state 
statutes in order to identify specific dates of implementation.  Table 2 provides an overview for 
                                                 
8 http://www.eere.energy.gov/afdc/progs/all_state_summary.php/afdc/0. 
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all states of key ethanol policies that were implemented during the time period that we study, as 
well as some details about those policies for each state. 
We group subsidies into three general categories.  Subsidies can be recurring or not, they 
can be based on plant size, or they can simply be a lump sum amount.  The column listings in 
Table 2 reflect these categories.  Column 1 of Table 2 includes all general subsidies that are not 
expressed on a per gallon basis.  In column 2, we list subsidies that are grants or subsidized loans 
to assist with plant construction and the like.  In column 3, we list subsides that recur annually 
and are expressed on a per gallon basis, which is the most common form of subsidy offered by 
the states.  Note that in several states the subsidies are substantial, up to 20 to 40 cents per gallon 
of ethanol produced.  Together with the 51 cent per gallon federal subsidy, the combined state-
federal subsidies total 71 to 90 cents per gallon of ethanol produced.    
We want to understand the factors that determine which states are most likely to pass 
ethanol subsidies.  To address this issue, we specify a discrete time proportional hazard model 
linking adoption of an ethanol subsidy to a number of state-level characteristics that may play an 
important role in a state‘s choice to pass such incentives, as discussed earlier.9  Our hazard model 
is defined as: 
(1)   H(t|X) = H0(t) * exp(1X1 + 2X2 + ... + kXk) 
where H(t|X) is the hazard of ethanol policy adoption given at time t, X1 ... Xk are predictor 
variables, and H0(t) is the baseline hazard at time t, which represents the hazard for a state with 
the value 0 for all the predictor variables.  The baseline hazard, which is the hazard for the 
respective state when all independent variable values are equal to zero, provides significant 
                                                 
9
 Jones and Branton (2005) show that Cox duration models are generally preferable to logit or probit approaches, 
particularly when investigating state policy adoption. Specifically, they demonstrate that when using a logit or probit 
approach the baseline hazard rate is either assumed to be constant or strong assumptions need to be made about the 
specification. In the Cox model the baseline hazard rate is left unspecified, which allows it to take any form the data 
suggests. 
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strength to this empirical approach, as it corrects for baseline differences between states that 
might influence the likelihood of subsidy adoption over time.
10
 Specifically, the Cox 
proportional hazard regression model produces an adjusted hazard ratio that takes into account 
any baseline differences between states that may have influenced the choice to adopt and are not 
captured in the predictor variables.  With hazard analysis framework, the goal is to capture the 
factors that lead to change in policy.  In this context, a state is included in the analysis up to the 
point that it adopts its first subsidy.  Once the subsidy is adopted, from that point on that state is 
no longer included as part of the ―at-risk‖ set.  As shown in Table 2, some states introduced more 
than one subsidy, introduced them at different points in time, or modified existing subsidies in 
subsequent periods.  In this hazard analysis, it is appropriate to focus on the first subsidy 
introduced in a particular state, and thus our dependent variable marks the introduction of the 
first subsidy for each state that adopts at least one subsidy during the period of analysis.  We 
recognize that in many states other general subsidies are available to businesses in general, 
including ethanol plants.  Our analysis focuses on the ethanol industry-specific subsidies, and 
thus does not consider these more general subsidies.  
Our primary interest is the role of political and lobbying interests in subsidy adoptions, so 
we include several measures and indicators of state-level characteristics that may affect the 
strength of the pro-subsidy political environment in a particular state.  As described in the 
previous section, we include two dummy variables indicating party control by Democrats or 
Republicans, a NCGA indicator variable, a check-off revenue time variable, and a state 
gubernatorial election year indicator variable.  The Democratic rule variable is equal to 1 when 
the Governor is a Democrat and the Democratic Party has majority control in both the Senate and 
                                                 
10 This issue is less of a concern if randomization has rendered both groups similar in terms of their baseline 
characteristics, but, obviously, this is not the case in studies of public policy adoption. 
 15 
House, and 0 otherwise.  Republican rule dummy is equal to 1 when the Governor is a 
Republican and the Republican Party has majority control in both the Senate and House, and 0 
otherwise.
11
  We hypothesize that political control by one party or another may influence the 
propensity to which a state imposes ethanol subsidy legislation. The NCGA variable indicates 
whether or not a state has an affiliation with the corn growers association, and  may reflect the 
political ―clout‖ or ―sway‖ that corn farmers may hold in their state to influence the likelihood of 
the introduction of incentives. The check-off variable indicates the number of years that a check-
off has been in place in a state, and we hypothesize that the longer the check-off has been in 
place, the greater the financial resources available to corn growers lobby on behalf of their 
interests in a given state.  We note that over our sample period numerous states became affiliated 
with the NCGA and introduced check-offs.
12
  We also include an indicator for whether or not the 
year is an election year in a given state; this variable indicates each year that a particular state 
held a gubernatorial election during the sample period. State elections may lead to an 
environment that is more conducive to new policy implementation.  Moreover, we hypothesize 
that declines in corn prices will motivate farmers and their agents to more vigorously pursue 
subsidies, so state corn prices are included as well. Lastly, as a measure of ―corn interest‖, we 
include state corn production as a variable; states with higher levels of corn production are more 
likely to adopt subsidies.
13
   
                                                 
11 The omitted category is state-years in which neither the Democrats nor the Republicans have full control. 
12 These states and the years that they joined the NCGA and introduced check-offs are, respectively:  Arkansas--
1997, 1998; Colorado—1979, 1987; Georgia—1984, 1996; Illinois—1971, 1982; Indiana—1971, 2007; Iowa—
1967, 1977; Kansas—1975, 1977; Kentucky—1982, 1990; Louisiana—1985, 1985; Maryland—1977, 1991; 
Michigan—1973, 1993; Minnesota—1978, 1990; Mississippi—1993, 2006; Missouri—1978, 1984; Nebraska—
1973, 1978; New York—1988, no check-off; North Carolina—1978, 1979; North Dakota—1987, 1991; Ohio—
1977, 1989; Oklahoma—1996, no check-off; Pennsylvania—1973, no check-off; South Carolina—1991, no check-
off; South Dakota—1986, 1988; Tennessee—1986, no check-off; Texas—1989, 1990; Virginia, 1979, 1980; 
Wisconsin—1975, 1982. 
13
 We recognize that politicians are sometimes influenced by actions taken in neighboring jurisdictions. To test for 
this possibility, we also included several different measures of neighbor state influences, such as measures of the 
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We also include several economic and demographic variables that play a role in ethanol 
subsidy adoption, or gasoline prices, per capita income, and state population.  As previously 
discussed, we hypothesize that higher gasoline prices increases the likelihood of subsidy 
adoption.  State population and per capita income are incorporated into the analysis to capture 
any potential effects of state size or wealth on the likelihood of adoption. Specifically, more rural 
states or states with lower income individual may be more inclined to support agricultural 
subsidies. 
 
Results 
Hazard ratios for various specification of equation (1) are reported in Table 3. The stated 
statistical significance of the hazard ratios (and their underlying parameter estimates) are 
calculated from robust standard errors that have been clustered at the state-level to allow for non-
independence of observations from the same state over time (Bertrand et al., 2004).  To provide 
guidance on the interpretation of the results, note that a hazard ratio of greater than one indicates 
a greater likelihood of subsidy adoption as this variable increases, while a ratio below one 
indicates the opposite.  
Column (1) in Table 3 presents results from a basic specification.     These results show 
that most of the variables (with the exception of corn prices and state per capita income) have 
hazard ratios above one, which indicates a positive effect on subsidy adoption.  However, only 
two variables seem to be meaningful with a high level of significance. First, the coefficient on 
corn production is both large in magnitude and statistically significant; the hazard ratio indicates 
that a state with 100,000 more bushels of corn production is 10 percent more likely to adopt an 
                                                                                                                                                             
number of contiguous states or proportion of contiguous states that have some sort of ethanol subsidy in place. 
Results were never significant and were left out for brevity, but these results are available upon request.    
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ethanol subsidy in a given year. Second, the coefficient on corn prices is also large and 
significant.  The estimated hazard ratio on corn price suggests that as corn prices fall the 
likelihood that a state will adopt an ethanol subsidy in a given year increases dramatically. This 
is a striking estimate, and indicates how changes in prices in this market are likely to motivate 
lobbying efforts.   
Although not always statistically significant, the other factors often have signs consistent 
with expectations, and a few are economically meaningful, though not measured precisely 
enough to be statistically significant.  Specifically, gas prices estimates fall just short of 
significance in model 1 (p-value =0.136), and indicate that a state is 25 percent more likely to 
introduce subsidies for ethanol production during a period in which gasoline prices are 10 cents 
higher.  Estimates of single political party control (whether Democrat or Republican) and the 
presence of and gubernatorial election year are suggestive of increasing the likelihood of subsidy 
adoption.
14
 The estimates for the effects of average state per capita income suggest that states 
with wealthier residents (and so states that may be less agriculturally focused) are less likely to 
adopt subsidies as well.  
We have also hypothesized that declines in corn prices increase the marginal value of 
ethanol subsidies, and thereby increase efforts to pass ethanol subsides.  Such efforts should be 
most effective in states where farmers have NCGA affiliations.  Recall from the earlier 
discussion the important linkages between corn prices and NCGA affiliation.  Due to these 
linkages, in our initial exploration we exclude the corn variable in column (2) of Table (3) and 
replace it with the NCGA indicator variable.  These results are consistent with expectations, as 
NCGA affiliation increases the likelihood that a state will adopt an ethanol subsidy in a given 
                                                 
14 We undertook a specification where we replaced the Democrat and the Republican dummy variable with a 
dummy variable that was equal to one if either party was in control and zero otherwise.  Our results were unaffected. 
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year by 257 percent.  This result clearly indicates the importance of a strong political lobby in 
influencing the policy adoption process.  
 Similar to NCGA affiliation, we have mentioned how the presence of ―check-off‖ revenues 
might be used to promote, market, and lobby on behalf of corn growers.  In column (3) of Table 
3 we replace the NCGA indicator variable with a measure of the ―check-off‖, a variable that 
captures variation across states in resources available to the state corn lobby.  These results 
demonstrate that the longer that a check-off has been in place the greater is the likelihood of 
ethanol subsidy adoption.  
 Recognizing that corn prices, NCGA affiliation, and measures of the ―check-off‖ may be 
correlated, in column (4) of Table 3 we include all three measures in order to determine which 
factor or factors plays the most important role in driving ethanol adoption. Results from this 
more comprehensive regression analysis indicate that, in addition to corn production and gas 
prices, changes in corn prices are a primary factor in ethanol subsidy adoption. This result 
suggests that falling corn prices motivates farmers to look for ways to boost corn demand, and 
farmers are likely to turn to the NCGA for this support.  Similarly, falling corn prices provide an 
avenue through which the NCGA can offer services to farmers.  Thus, corn prices appear to be 
the dominant factor driving farmers to the NCGA, which in turn leads to ―check-off‖ support and 
ultimately to ethanol subsidies. 
 Last we note that across specifications in columns (1) to (4) that the coefficients on 
Democrat and Republican Party control are large in magnitude, but are too imprecisely measured 
to be statistically significant. This result suggests that there may be environments in which party 
control is important, but others in which it is not. Specifically, it may be the case that party 
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control plays an important role in ethanol subsidy policy when gasoline prices are high, when 
corn prices are low, or in states with high levels of corn production. 
To investigate these interrelationships further, we interact the political party control 
dummy variables with these covariates in separate regressions. While the interactions between 
party controls and either gas prices or corn prices yield no significant coefficients (and are not 
reported in Table 3), the corn production-party control interaction reveals a statistically 
significant and meaningful relationship.  As shown in column (5) of Table 3, the interaction 
between Democrat control and corn production suggests that subsidy adoption is more likely in 
states with Democratic control when levels of corn production are high. 
 
V. Conclusions 
 We present evidence that state government subsidies/tax credits for ethanol are strongly 
influenced by several factors, especially political considerations.  Specifically, we find that states 
are more likely to adopt ethanol subsidies when corn production is high, when gasoline prices are 
high, when corn prices are low, when a state is closely affiliated with the NCGA, when a check-
off is present, and when state government is under the control of Democrats (but only in corn 
producing states).  A particularly interesting feature of our work is that it tracks policy 
innovation in an industry from its inception.  Over the 1984-2007 period, we observe the 
complete emergence of the ethanol industry, and our empirical work identifies the impact of 
numerous state-level policy changes aimed at a subsidizing the industry.  More generally, our 
work contributes to the literature that has sought to evaluate the policy innovation in which 
policies are deliberately chosen to reflect the political calculus of the relevant actors.  To our 
 20 
knowledge this is the first study to explicitly study subsidy adoption in general and ethanol 
subsidies in particular.   
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TABLE 1: SUMMARY STATISTICS, 1984 - 2007 
 
Variables 
Mean 
(Standard Deviation) 
Ethanol Subsidy Indicator 0.143 
 (0.350) 
Bushels of Corn Produced (in 1,000s) 173.456 
 (363.227) 
Corn Price (in 2007$) 
 
1.565 
(1.671) 
Population (in 100,000s) 52.156 
 (56.947) 
State Per Capita Income (in 1,000s) 28.869 
 (6.405) 
Gasoline Prices (2007 $) 128.956 
 (40.011) 
Democrat Control 0.257 
 (0.437) 
Republican Control 0.168 
 (0.373) 
NCGA Affiliation 0.466 
 (0.499) 
Years of Check-off  3.762 
 (7.031) 
Gubernatorial Election Year 0.261 
 (0.440) 
Number of Border States  0.292 
 (0.455) 
 
Observations: 
 
1400 
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TABLE 2: STATE ETHANOL SUBSIDY POLICIES, 1984-2007 
State Tax Credit/ Subsidy Grants/Loans Per Gallon Tax Credit/Subsidy 
Alabama   --- --- --- 
Alaska --- --- --- 
Arizona --- --- --- 
Arkansas --- --- 2007 
California --- 2006-2007 --- 
Colorado --- --- --- 
Connecticut --- --- --- 
Delaware --- --- --- 
Florida 2006 – 2007 --- --- 
Georgia --- --- --- 
Hawaii 2002 – 2007 --- --- 
Idaho --- --- --- 
Illinois --- 2003-2007 --- 
Indiana --- --- 1982-1986, 2004 - 2007 
Iowa 2001-2007 1994-2007, 1996-2007 --- 
Kansas --- --- 2001 - 2007 
Kentucky --- --- --- 
Louisiana --- --- --- 
Maine --- 1999-2007 2004 - 2007 
Maryland --- --- 2006 - 2007 
Massachusetts --- --- --- 
Michigan 2003 – 2007 --- --- 
Minnesota --- --- 1986 - 2007 
Mississippi --- --- 2002 - 2007 
Missouri --- --- 2002 - 2007 
Montana --- --- 1983 - 2007 
Nebraska 1990 – 1999 --- 2000 - 2007 
Nevada --- --- --- 
New Hampshire --- --- --- 
New Jersey --- --- --- 
New Mexico --- --- --- 
New York --- --- --- 
North Carolina 2000 – 2007 --- --- 
North Dakota* --- 2007 2005 - 2007 
Ohio --- --- --- 
Oklahoma --- --- 2004 - 2007 
Oregon 2006 – 2007 --- --- 
Pennsylvania --- 2006-2007 2005 - 2007 
Rhode Island --- --- --- 
South Carolina --- --- 2007 
South Dakota --- --- 1996 - 2007 
Tennessee --- --- --- 
Texas --- --- 2004 -2007 
Utah --- --- --- 
Vermont --- --- --- 
Virginia --- --- 2007 
Washington 2003 – 2007 --- --- 
West Virginia --- --- --- 
Wisconsin --- --- 2001 - 2006 
Wyoming --- --- 1998 - 2007 
*North Dakota also has a per plant credit. 
Source: Compilations by authors.
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TABLE 3: ETHANOL SUBSIDY ADOPTION: ESTIMATES FROM A PROPORTIONAL HAZARD MODEL 
 Model: Hazard Ratios for Ethanol Subsidy or Credit Adoption 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 
Bushels of Corn Production (in 1,000s) 1.001 1.001 1.001 1.001 1.001 
 [0.006] [0.002] [0.019] [0.059] [0.019] 
State Corn Price (in 2007$) 0.085 --- --- 0.131 0.138 
 [0.003] --- --- [0.051] [0.066] 
Population (in 100,000s) 1.003 1.002 1.002 1.002 1.003 
 [0.246] [0.679] [0.390] [0.263] [0.279] 
State Per Capita Income (in 1,000s) 0.964 0.954 0.943 0.961 0.955 
 [0.359] [0.196] [0.135] [0.344] [0.269] 
Gasoline Price (2007 $) 1.025 1.041 1.024 1.034 1.036 
 [0.136] [0.016] [0.159] [0.035] [0.045] 
Democrat Control 1.659 1.745 1.674 1.669 0.975 
 [0.345] [0.293] [0.346] [0.351] [0.968] 
Republican Control 1.221 1.443 1.494 1.229 1.300 
 [0.652] [0.450] [0.402] [0.642] [0.607] 
Gubernatorial Election Year 1.073 1.146 1.140 1.126 1.027 
 [0.868] [0.765] [0.753] [0.770] [0.952] 
NCGA Affiliation  3.569 --- 1.417 1.793 
  [0.017] --- [0.646] [0.370] 
Years of Check-off    1.055 1.018 0.755 
   [0.063] [0.638] [0.585] 
Corn Production (in 1,000s) X Democrat Control     1.006 
     [0.000] 
Corn Production (in 1,000s) X Republican Control     1.000 
     [0.820] 
Observations 1011 
p-values are reported in brackets. All robust standard errors (not shown) were clustered at the state-level. 
Estimates that are statistically significant at the 0.10 level or less are highlighted in bold.  
 27 
 Appendix 
Definitions and Sources of Variables 
 
Variable Definitions Source 
Population Number of people residing in a state in a given year Census 
Gasoline Price Price of natural gas sold to commercial consumers in each 
state-year in dollars per thousand cubic feet 
DOE, 
EIA 
Per Gallon Credit/Subsidy Per gallon tax credit and/or direct subsidy in real 2007 
dollars.  A full listing of existing subsidies is available at 
http://www.afdc.energy.gov/afdc/incentives_laws.html. 
DOE, 
SCA 
Production Tax Credit/Subsidy Indicator variable equal to one if the state has a production 
tax credit or subsidy, and zero otherwise.  This variable 
includes an array of subsidies including:  grants, loans, per 
plant subsidies, production tax credits, and infrastructure 
tax credits.  A full listing of existing subsidies is available 
at http://www.afdc.energy.gov/afdc/incentives_laws.html. 
DOE, 
SCA 
State Corn Price Average corn price per bushel in each state-year USDA 
State Per Capita Income Average income per capita in a state BEA 
Bushels of Corn Production State corn production in millions of bushels per year USDA 
Democrat (Republican) Control Indicator variable equal to one if the Democrat 
(Republican) Party controls both the state legislature and 
governor‘s office in a given year, and zero otherwise. 
SCA 
NCGA Affiliation Dummy variable that equals one if there is a National Corn 
Grows Association affiliation in a given state in a given year, 
and zero otherwise. 
SCA 
Check-off Number of years a check-off has been in place in a state in 
each year. 
SCA 
Gubernatorial Election Year Dummy variable that equals one if there is a gubernatorial 
election in a given state in a given year, and zero otherwise. 
SCA 
Sources: 
BEA: United States Bureau of Economic Analysis  
Census: United States Census Bureau 
DOE:  United States Department of Energy, available at http://www.doe.gov 
EIA: Energy Information Administration (part of DOE), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov 
SCA:  Compiled by the authors 
USDA: United States Department of Agriculture, available at www.usda.gov  
 
